The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 35
... involved when one threatens an act that he would have no incentive to perform but that is designed to deter through its promise of mutual harm . To threaten massive retaliation against small encroachments is of this nature , as is the ...
... involved when one threatens an act that he would have no incentive to perform but that is designed to deter through its promise of mutual harm . To threaten massive retaliation against small encroachments is of this nature , as is the ...
Page 89
... involved in wars , strikes , negotiations , and so forth , requires a more ambivalent term.5 In the rest of this book I shall refer to the mixed game as a bargaining game or mixed - motive game , since these terms seem to catch the ...
... involved in wars , strikes , negotiations , and so forth , requires a more ambivalent term.5 In the rest of this book I shall refer to the mixed game as a bargaining game or mixed - motive game , since these terms seem to catch the ...
Page 183
... involved in the decision process whether the threatener wishes it or not . So the interpretation of randomization as just a means of manipulating the size of the threat is applicable only in some cases . anything to work with ; but to ...
... involved in the decision process whether the threatener wishes it or not . So the interpretation of randomization as just a means of manipulating the size of the threat is applicable only in some cases . anything to work with ; but to ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game