The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 17
... irrationality . " Hitler , the French Parliament , the com- mander of a bomber , the radar operators at Pearl Harbor , Khrushchev , and the ... irrational . " ― - The second observation is related to the first INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 17.
... irrationality . " Hitler , the French Parliament , the com- mander of a bomber , the radar operators at Pearl Harbor , Khrushchev , and the ... irrational . " ― - The second observation is related to the first INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 17.
Page 213
... irrational attack equal to 0.8 for C and 0.2 for R , we get Fig . 21. And with probabilities of 0.8 apiece for irrational attack , we get Fig . 22 . I II 0 -.1 i 0 .1 .1 .04 ii -.1 .04 FIG . 22 The probabilities of irrational attack in ...
... irrational attack equal to 0.8 for C and 0.2 for R , we get Fig . 21. And with probabilities of 0.8 apiece for irrational attack , we get Fig . 22 . I II 0 -.1 i 0 .1 .1 .04 ii -.1 .04 FIG . 22 The probabilities of irrational attack in ...
Page 217
... irrational attack at each move , the outcome depends on whether P. = 1 − ( 1 P = I - -1 - - P. ) " and ( 1 - P , ) " - 1 meet the conditions derived earlier . If so , each player knows that the other will not subsequently choose to ...
... irrational attack at each move , the outcome depends on whether P. = 1 − ( 1 P = I - -1 - - P. ) " and ( 1 - P , ) " - 1 meet the conditions derived earlier . If so , each player knows that the other will not subsequently choose to ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game