## The Strategy of Conflict |

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Page 211

parameter represents we shall leave open: it may be taken to be the probability

that the player is

misconceived and that he “really” prefers unilateral surprise attack, or the

probability that ...

parameter represents we shall leave open: it may be taken to be the probability

that the player is

**irrational**, or the probability that the pay-off matrix ismisconceived and that he “really” prefers unilateral surprise attack, or the

probability that ...

Page 213

21 bilities of

with probabilities of o.8 apiece for

.04 ii —.1 .04 FIG. 22 The probabilities of

21 bilities of

**irrational**attack equal to o.8 for C and o.2 for R, we get Fig. 21. Andwith probabilities of o.8 apiece for

**irrational**attack, we get Fig. 22. I II 0 | –.1 i 0 1 1.04 ii —.1 .04 FIG. 22 The probabilities of

**irrational**attack in the first of our ...Page 217

If each player has n moves, with probability P, or P. of

move, the outcome depends on whether P. = 1 – (1 – P.)" and P. = 1 – (1 — P.)"-"

meet the conditions derived earlier. If so, each player knows that the other will not

...

If each player has n moves, with probability P, or P. of

**irrational**attack at eachmove, the outcome depends on whether P. = 1 – (1 – P.)" and P. = 1 – (1 — P.)"-"

meet the conditions derived earlier. If so, each player knows that the other will not

...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game