The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 58
... kind of uniqueness ; the man and his wife cannot meet at the " lost and found " if the store has several . The writer's experiments with alternative maps indicated clearly that a map with many houses and a single crossroads sends people ...
... kind of uniqueness ; the man and his wife cannot meet at the " lost and found " if the store has several . The writer's experiments with alternative maps indicated clearly that a map with many houses and a single crossroads sends people ...
Page 68
... kind of resignation of both participants . " Fact - finding " reports may also tend to draw expectations to a focus , by providing a suggestion to fill the vacuum of indeterminacy that otherwise exists : it is not the facts themselves ...
... kind of resignation of both participants . " Fact - finding " reports may also tend to draw expectations to a focus , by providing a suggestion to fill the vacuum of indeterminacy that otherwise exists : it is not the facts themselves ...
Page 188
... kind of accident , false alarm , or mechanical failure ; through somebody's panic , madness , or mischief ; through a misapprehension of enemy intentions or a correct apprehension of the enemy's misapprehension of ours - is not an ...
... kind of accident , false alarm , or mechanical failure ; through somebody's panic , madness , or mischief ; through a misapprehension of enemy intentions or a correct apprehension of the enemy's misapprehension of ours - is not an ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game