The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 132
... matrix , Row's promise brings its own reward : Column can safely choose II , yielding superior outcomes for both players . ( If , in the left - hand matrix , moves are in turn , the player who chooses second must have the power to ...
... matrix , Row's promise brings its own reward : Column can safely choose II , yielding superior outcomes for both players . ( If , in the left - hand matrix , moves are in turn , the player who chooses second must have the power to ...
Page 150
... MATRIX One is led to suppose that , if a game has potential moves like threats , commitments , and promises that are susceptible of formal analysis , it must be possible to represent such moves in the traditional form of strategy ...
... MATRIX One is led to suppose that , if a game has potential moves like threats , commitments , and promises that are susceptible of formal analysis , it must be possible to represent such moves in the traditional form of strategy ...
Page 225
... matrix . ( Actually , stability of the matrix game , as distinct from stability of a parametric - behavior equilib- rium , is not a relevant concept for the parametric - behavior hy- pothesis ; to contemplate the matrix and to ...
... matrix . ( Actually , stability of the matrix game , as distinct from stability of a parametric - behavior equilib- rium , is not a relevant concept for the parametric - behavior hy- pothesis ; to contemplate the matrix and to ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game