## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 132

In the left-hand

I I 0 1 FIG. 12 are to be simultaneous, only a pair of promises can be effective; in

the right-hand

In the left-hand

**matrix**of Fig. 12, if choices I II I II i 0 -1 i 0 — I 0 2 0 2 ii 2 I ii 0 1 —I I 0 1 FIG. 12 are to be simultaneous, only a pair of promises can be effective; in

the right-hand

**matrix**, Row's promise brings its own reward: Column can safely ...Page 150

INCORPORATION OF MOVES IN A GAME

a game has potential moves like threats, commitments, and promises that are

susceptible of formal analysis, it must be possible to represent such moves in the

...

INCORPORATION OF MOVES IN A GAME

**MATRIX**One is led to suppose that, ifa game has potential moves like threats, commitments, and promises that are

susceptible of formal analysis, it must be possible to represent such moves in the

...

Page 225

(Actually, stability of the

behavior equilibrium, is not a relevant concept for the parametric-behavior

hypothesis; to contemplate the

project his ...

(Actually, stability of the

**matrix**game, as distinct from stability of a parametric-behavior equilibrium, is not a relevant concept for the parametric-behavior

hypothesis; to contemplate the

**matrix**and to anticipate the other's action is toproject his ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game