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The commitment is a means of gaining first move in a game in which first move
carries an advantage; the threat is a commitment to a strategy for second move. A
threat can therefore be effective only if the game is one in which the first move is ...
It is profitable only if it yields a better payoff than either first move or second move
alone and when one can make the other player move first either actually or by
promise. (If second move alone is as good, the threat is unnecessary; and if first ...
THE GAME AS A SEQUENCE OF MOVES IN TURN We get the same result if we
try a game with moves-in-turn for the pay-off matrix that ... At his own last move, R
knows what C will elect, and makes a predictable choice that depends on Pe.
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
The Retarded Science of International Strategy
2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I
Bargaining Communication and Limited War
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