The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 213
... attack equal to 0.8 for C and 0.2 for R , we get Fig . 21. And with probabilities of 0.8 apiece for irrational ... no escaping those two basic probabilities ; but the contemplation of the probabilities has not led to their aggravation . Each ...
... attack equal to 0.8 for C and 0.2 for R , we get Fig . 21. And with probabilities of 0.8 apiece for irrational ... no escaping those two basic probabilities ; but the contemplation of the probabilities has not led to their aggravation . Each ...
Page 222
... no - attack is still the jointly preferred outcome . The condi- tions for a joint preference at no - attack , with optimally adjusted warning systems , would be : 11 " It is assumed for convenience of illustration that an inadvertent ...
... no - attack is still the jointly preferred outcome . The condi- tions for a joint preference at no - attack , with optimally adjusted warning systems , would be : 11 " It is assumed for convenience of illustration that an inadvertent ...
Page 224
... no - attack . Thus , if both players have optimal adjustments with R < 1 , those optimal values of R and B are also perforce consistent with joint pref- erence at no - attack . The relation of B , to B , under this behavior hypothesis ...
... no - attack . Thus , if both players have optimal adjustments with R < 1 , those optimal values of R and B are also perforce consistent with joint pref- erence at no - attack . The relation of B , to B , under this behavior hypothesis ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game