## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 213

21 bilities of irrational attack equal to o.8 for C and o.2 for R, we get Fig. ... Each

player has fully taken them into account, has seen that there is still a jointly

preferred solution at

strategy.

21 bilities of irrational attack equal to o.8 for C and o.2 for R, we get Fig. ... Each

player has fully taken them into account, has seen that there is still a jointly

preferred solution at

**no**-**attack**, and by the original hypothesis has chosen thatstrategy.

Page 222

... together with the observed (or expected optimal) values of R, and Bo, to see

whether joint

joint preference at

1 ...

... together with the observed (or expected optimal) values of R, and Bo, to see

whether joint

**no**-**attack**is still the jointly preferred outcome. The conditions for ajoint preference at

**no**-**attack**, with optimally adjusted warning systems, would be:1 ...

Page 224

Since f is presumed positive, the denominator must be positive if V, is to be

maximized with R < I; but the condition that the denominator be positive is

precisely the condition that P. must meet in order that player R still prefer joint

Since f is presumed positive, the denominator must be positive if V, is to be

maximized with R < I; but the condition that the denominator be positive is

precisely the condition that P. must meet in order that player R still prefer joint

**no**-**attack**.### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game