The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 258
... weapons ? There is no more difference between Russians and Chinese than there is between nuclear and other weapons ; similarly for the difference between Chinese and North Koreans , or between Americans and Nationalist Chinese , British ...
... weapons ? There is no more difference between Russians and Chinese than there is between nuclear and other weapons ; similarly for the difference between Chinese and North Koreans , or between Americans and Nationalist Chinese , British ...
Page 263
... nuclear and nonnuclear weap- ons , a distinction relevant to the process of limiting war . It is a distinction that to some extent we can strengthen or weaken , clarify or blur . We can strengthen the ... NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LIMITED WAR 263.
... nuclear and nonnuclear weap- ons , a distinction relevant to the process of limiting war . It is a distinction that to some extent we can strengthen or weaken , clarify or blur . We can strengthen the ... NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LIMITED WAR 263.
Page 265
... nuclear weapons are different would be as powerfully present on the oc- casion of the next limited war after they had already been used in one . We can ... weapons ; ordinarily it would be supposed that we NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LIMITED WAR 265.
... nuclear weapons are different would be as powerfully present on the oc- casion of the next limited war after they had already been used in one . We can ... weapons ; ordinarily it would be supposed that we NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LIMITED WAR 265.
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game