The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 93
... objective situation , except insofar as the objective situation may provide some clue for a concerted choice . The analogy is not just trying to vote with the majority but trying to vote with a majority when everyone wants to be in a So ...
... objective situation , except insofar as the objective situation may provide some clue for a concerted choice . The analogy is not just trying to vote with the majority but trying to vote with a majority when everyone wants to be in a So ...
Page 96
... objective is to make contact with the other player through some imaginative process of introspection , of searching for shared clues ; in the minimax strategy of a zero - sum game- most strikingly so with randomized choice - one's whole ...
... objective is to make contact with the other player through some imaginative process of introspection , of searching for shared clues ; in the minimax strategy of a zero - sum game- most strikingly so with randomized choice - one's whole ...
Page 132
... objective terms capable of objective supervision . Promises are generally thought of as bilateral ( contractual ) commitments , given against a quid pro quo that is often a prom- ise in return . But there is incentive for a unilateral ...
... objective terms capable of objective supervision . Promises are generally thought of as bilateral ( contractual ) commitments , given against a quid pro quo that is often a prom- ise in return . But there is incentive for a unilateral ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game