The Strategy of Conflict |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 46
Page 18
... one's agents and partners . In principle , one might evade extortion equally well by drugging his brain ... one's own actions or of one's own assets . Mossadeq and my small children have already been referred to ; but the same tactic is ...
... one's agents and partners . In principle , one might evade extortion equally well by drugging his brain ... one's own actions or of one's own assets . Mossadeq and my small children have already been referred to ; but the same tactic is ...
Page 117
... one's self in basic values and can con- sequently estimate the other's values by the simple application of symmetry ... one's maneuvers are not un- ambiguous in their revelation of one's value systems and may even be deliberately ...
... one's self in basic values and can con- sequently estimate the other's values by the simple application of symmetry ... one's maneuvers are not un- ambiguous in their revelation of one's value systems and may even be deliberately ...
Page 160
... one's self will behave . One constrains the partner's choice by constraining one's own behavior . The object is to set up for one's self and communicate persuasively to the other player a mode of behavior ( including conditional ...
... one's self will behave . One constrains the partner's choice by constraining one's own behavior . The object is to set up for one's self and communicate persuasively to the other player a mode of behavior ( including conditional ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
10 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game