## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 54

Page 45

Each party must be confident that the

opportunities by destroying trust at the outset. ... Neither may be willing to trust the

a large ...

Each party must be confident that the

**other**will not jeopardize futureopportunities by destroying trust at the outset. ... Neither may be willing to trust the

**other's**prudence (or the**other's**confidence in the first's prudence, and so forth) ona large ...

Page 115

Nor can we set up as a general case the bargaining game in which each side

has foreknowledge of the

true” payoff matrix of the

about ...

Nor can we set up as a general case the bargaining game in which each side

has foreknowledge of the

**other's**preferences. To assume that either knows the “true” payoff matrix of the

**other**is often to make an extraordinary assumptionabout ...

Page 223

This assumption tends to make each person's choice of B a rising function of the

probability that the

that the corresponding change in the

...

This assumption tends to make each person's choice of B a rising function of the

probability that the

**other**will attack. (It only “tends to,” since there is a possibilitythat the corresponding change in the

**other's**R provides an offsetting inducement,...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game