The Strategy of Conflict |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 81
Page 69
... outcome is taken to reflect the relative skills of the parties to the bargain , it may be important to identify that skill as the ability to set the stage in such a way as to give prominence to some particular outcome that would be ...
... outcome is taken to reflect the relative skills of the parties to the bargain , it may be important to identify that skill as the ability to set the stage in such a way as to give prominence to some particular outcome that would be ...
Page 70
... outcome is one from which at least one of the parties , and probably both , would have been willing to retreat for the sake of agreement , and very often the other party knows it . Any potential outcome is therefore one that either ...
... outcome is one from which at least one of the parties , and probably both , would have been willing to retreat for the sake of agreement , and very often the other party knows it . Any potential outcome is therefore one that either ...
Page 109
... outcomes as they come within view of the scanning device . We employ a mechanical scanning device , which moves about in the range of possible outcomes , pointing to , lighting up , or focusing on one possible outcome after another . It ...
... outcomes as they come within view of the scanning device . We employ a mechanical scanning device , which moves about in the range of possible outcomes , pointing to , lighting up , or focusing on one possible outcome after another . It ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
10 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game