The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 3
... participants in a conflict in all their complexity — with regard to both " ra- tional " and " irrational " behavior , conscious and unconscious , and to motivations as well as to calculations and those that focus on the more rational ...
... participants in a conflict in all their complexity — with regard to both " ra- tional " and " irrational " behavior , conscious and unconscious , and to motivations as well as to calculations and those that focus on the more rational ...
Page 4
... participants in a conflict ; and by demanding certain kinds of consistency in the behavior of our hypothetical participants , we can examine alternative courses of behavior according to whether or not they meet those standards of ...
... participants in a conflict ; and by demanding certain kinds of consistency in the behavior of our hypothetical participants , we can examine alternative courses of behavior according to whether or not they meet those standards of ...
Page 73
... participants to the obviously " fair " or " reasonable " solution , we may exaggerate the " pressure " or at least misunderstand the way it works on the participants unless we give credit to its power to coordinate the participants ...
... participants to the obviously " fair " or " reasonable " solution , we may exaggerate the " pressure " or at least misunderstand the way it works on the participants unless we give credit to its power to coordinate the participants ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game