The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 87
... particular station , Moriarty gaining more if both get off at some other particular station , both losing unless they get off at the same station . This is the usual nonzero - sum game , or " imperfect - correlation - of - pref- erences ...
... particular station , Moriarty gaining more if both get off at some other particular station , both losing unless they get off at the same station . This is the usual nonzero - sum game , or " imperfect - correlation - of - pref- erences ...
Page 92
... particular role , or by another's role , because it is the only role that in the circumstances can be identified by a process of tacit consent . A good example might be the esprit de corps ( or lack of it ) of an army unit or naval ...
... particular role , or by another's role , because it is the only role that in the circumstances can be identified by a process of tacit consent . A good example might be the esprit de corps ( or lack of it ) of an army unit or naval ...
Page 201
... particular contingencies cannot exactly be fore- told by any advance calculations , that the response to a particular contingency may depend on certain random or haphazard proc- esses , or that there will be faulty information , faulty ...
... particular contingencies cannot exactly be fore- told by any advance calculations , that the response to a particular contingency may depend on certain random or haphazard proc- esses , or that there will be faulty information , faulty ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game