The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 129
... penalty is greater than 2. Otherwise it is clear to Column that Row's re- sponse to II will be ii , in spite of the ... penalty and a disadvantage to the victim to be able to invoke penalty on his own breach of contract , that is , to be ...
... penalty is greater than 2. Otherwise it is clear to Column that Row's re- sponse to II will be ii , in spite of the ... penalty and a disadvantage to the victim to be able to invoke penalty on his own breach of contract , that is , to be ...
Page 130
... penalty that Column could invoke would be 4 ; any smaller penalty leaves him preferring II to I when Row chooses iii . The lower limit to a persuasive penalty on Row's noncompliance would be 3. If , then , the situation is one in which ...
... penalty that Column could invoke would be 4 ; any smaller penalty leaves him preferring II to I when Row chooses iii . The lower limit to a persuasive penalty on Row's noncompliance would be 3. If , then , the situation is one in which ...
Page 150
... penalty incurred or by a maneuver that destroys his power not to comply ( like extracting his own teeth and claws ) ... penalty on his own failure to pursue subse- quently the particular strategy of response that he has selected beforehand ...
... penalty incurred or by a maneuver that destroys his power not to comply ( like extracting his own teeth and claws ) ... penalty on his own failure to pursue subse- quently the particular strategy of response that he has selected beforehand ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game