The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 102
... play a game as follows.14 At each " move , " each player will distribute five chips among states on his map . The moves are compared , and if the two players have put a chip apiece in the same state , those two chips are removed ; if one ...
... play a game as follows.14 At each " move , " each player will distribute five chips among states on his map . The moves are compared , and if the two players have put a chip apiece in the same state , those two chips are removed ; if one ...
Page 169
... player's hostility in the game is a significant constraint on his ability to perceive the other player's meaning , it becomes part of the " communication structure . " An experiment by Deutsch is pertinent . He let pairs of players play ...
... player's hostility in the game is a significant constraint on his ability to perceive the other player's meaning , it becomes part of the " communication structure . " An experiment by Deutsch is pertinent . He let pairs of players play ...
Page 175
... play a central role . It may be no exaggeration to say that the potentialities of randomized behavior account for most of the interest in game theory during the past one and one- half decades.1 The essence of randomization in a two ...
... play a central role . It may be no exaggeration to say that the potentialities of randomized behavior account for most of the interest in game theory during the past one and one- half decades.1 The essence of randomization in a two ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game