The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 109
... possible outcomes , pointing to , lighting up , or focusing on one possible outcome after another . It follows perhaps some regular course , perhaps a random course . Let this machine scan ; let the players watch it scan , watch their ...
... possible outcomes , pointing to , lighting up , or focusing on one possible outcome after another . It follows perhaps some regular course , perhaps a random course . Let this machine scan ; let the players watch it scan , watch their ...
Page 283
... possible alternatives . Now , is it possible for two rational players , through anything other than sheer coincidence or magic , to focus their attention on the same particular outcome and each " rationally " be con- fident that the ...
... possible alternatives . Now , is it possible for two rational players , through anything other than sheer coincidence or magic , to focus their attention on the same particular outcome and each " rationally " be con- fident that the ...
Page 285
... possible to set up games in which some other aspect of the game focusses expectations . ( These other aspects are com- monly not contained in the mathematical structure of the game but are part of the " topical content " ; that is ...
... possible to set up games in which some other aspect of the game focusses expectations . ( These other aspects are com- monly not contained in the mathematical structure of the game but are part of the " topical content " ; that is ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game