The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 66
... preference and could not even do him a favor or make a " fair " compromise if you wished to , the only basis for concerting is to see what message you can both read in your schedule . Your own preferred letter seems the indi- cated ...
... preference and could not even do him a favor or make a " fair " compromise if you wished to , the only basis for concerting is to see what message you can both read in your schedule . Your own preferred letter seems the indi- cated ...
Page 115
... preferences . To assume that either knows the " true " payoff matrix of the other is often to make an extraordinary assumption about the institu ... preference In special cases the information can be conveyed . In INTERDEPENDENT DECISION 115.
... preferences . To assume that either knows the " true " payoff matrix of the other is often to make an extraordinary assumption about the institu ... preference In special cases the information can be conveyed . In INTERDEPENDENT DECISION 115.
Page 126
... preferences . It is true of the right - hand matrix as well . That one dramatizes the essential character of the threat ... preference is clear ; and , once Row has given him the game shown by Luce and Raiffa is thus a feature of the ...
... preferences . It is true of the right - hand matrix as well . That one dramatizes the essential character of the threat ... preference is clear ; and , once Row has given him the game shown by Luce and Raiffa is thus a feature of the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game