The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 19
... principle that one should pick good nego- tiators to represent him and then give them complete flexibility and authority - a principle commonly voiced by negotiators themselves is by no means as self - evident as its proponents suggest ...
... principle that one should pick good nego- tiators to represent him and then give them complete flexibility and authority - a principle commonly voiced by negotiators themselves is by no means as self - evident as its proponents suggest ...
Page 34
... principle of , say , nonrecognition of governments im- posed by force , and elects to nail his demands to that principle in the present negotiation , he not only adduces precedent behind his claim but risks the principle itself . Having ...
... principle of , say , nonrecognition of governments im- posed by force , and elects to nail his demands to that principle in the present negotiation , he not only adduces precedent behind his claim but risks the principle itself . Having ...
Page 158
... principle that , in bargaining , weakness may be strength . ) There is probably no single principle of game theory that epitomizes so strikingly the mixed - motive game as this principle that a worsening of some or even all of the ...
... principle that , in bargaining , weakness may be strength . ) There is probably no single principle of game theory that epitomizes so strikingly the mixed - motive game as this principle that a worsening of some or even all of the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game