The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 211
... probability that the player is irrational , or the probability that the pay - off matrix is misconceived and that he " really " pre- fers unilateral surprise attack , or the probability that somebody will make a mistake and ...
... probability that the player is irrational , or the probability that the pay - off matrix is misconceived and that he " really " pre- fers unilateral surprise attack , or the probability that somebody will make a mistake and ...
Page 217
... probability , 1 - ( 1 P. ) 2 , that C may attack on either of the next two moves , and makes his own choice in a predictable way . And so on . If each player has n moves , with probability P , or P. of irrational attack at each move ...
... probability , 1 - ( 1 P. ) 2 , that C may attack on either of the next two moves , and makes his own choice in a predictable way . And so on . If each player has n moves , with probability P , or P. of irrational attack at each move ...
Page 221
... probability of being attacked not by an overt decision to act or abstain , but by adjusting the like- lihood that he may mistakenly attack . One's response to an in- crease in the probability of being attacked is to shift the criteria ...
... probability of being attacked not by an overt decision to act or abstain , but by adjusting the like- lihood that he may mistakenly attack . One's response to an in- crease in the probability of being attacked is to shift the criteria ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game