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parameter represents we shall leave open: it may be taken to be the probability
that the player is irrational, or the probability that the pay-off matrix is
misconceived and that he “really” prefers unilateral surprise attack, or the
probability that ...
19; he actually will attack, then, with probability Po. At his own last move, R
knows what C will elect, and makes a predictable choice that depends on Pe. At
the preceding move, C knows what R will choose, takes P, into account and
makes a ...
But now we can have a model of a rational decider who responds to an estimate
of the probability of being attacked not by an overt decision to act or abstain, but
by adjusting the likelihood that he may mistakenly attack. One's response to an ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
The Retarded Science of International Strategy
2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I
Bargaining Communication and Limited War
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