## The Strategy of Conflict |

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Page 211

parameter represents we shall leave open: it may be taken to be the

that the player is irrational, or the

misconceived and that he “really” prefers unilateral surprise attack, or the

parameter represents we shall leave open: it may be taken to be the

**probability**that the player is irrational, or the

**probability**that the pay-off matrix ismisconceived and that he “really” prefers unilateral surprise attack, or the

**probability**that ...Page 217

19; he actually will attack, then, with

knows what C will elect, and makes a predictable choice that depends on Pe. At

the preceding move, C knows what R will choose, takes P, into account and

makes a ...

19; he actually will attack, then, with

**probability**Po. At his own last move, Rknows what C will elect, and makes a predictable choice that depends on Pe. At

the preceding move, C knows what R will choose, takes P, into account and

makes a ...

Page 221

But now we can have a model of a rational decider who responds to an estimate

of the

by adjusting the likelihood that he may mistakenly attack. One's response to an ...

But now we can have a model of a rational decider who responds to an estimate

of the

**probability**of being attacked not by an overt decision to act or abstain, butby adjusting the likelihood that he may mistakenly attack. One's response to an ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game