## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 55

The writer has tried this and other analogous

of respondents; and the conclusion is that people often can ... *In the writer's

sample, 36 persons concerted on “heads” in

The writer has tried this and other analogous

**problems**on an unscientific sampleof respondents; and the conclusion is that people often can ... *In the writer's

sample, 36 persons concerted on “heads” in

**problem**I, and only 6 chose “tails.Page 63

In those

is, between A and B, the A formulations were matched with the B formulations in

deriving “In the first

In those

**problems**where there is some asymmetry between “you” and “him,” thatis, between A and B, the A formulations were matched with the B formulations in

deriving “In the first

**problem**, 16 out of 22 A's and 15 out of 22 B's chose heads.Page 64

The general conclusion, as given in more detail in the footnote, is that the

participants can “solve” their

they certainly do conspicuously better than any chance methods would have

permitted, ...

The general conclusion, as given in more detail in the footnote, is that the

participants can “solve” their

**problem**in a substantial proportion of the cases;they certainly do conspicuously better than any chance methods would have

permitted, ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game