## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 85

If chess is the standard example of a zero-sum game, charades may typify the

game of

may do the same for the coordination game. An experiment of O. K. Moore and ...

If chess is the standard example of a zero-sum game, charades may typify the

game of

**pure**coordination; if pursuit epitomizes the zero-sum game, rendezvousmay do the same for the coordination game. An experiment of O. K. Moore and ...

Page 88

All possible outcomes of a

all of the points on a negatively inclined line, those of a

game by some or all of the points on a positively inclined line. In the mixed game,

...

All possible outcomes of a

**pure**-conflict game would be represented by some orall of the points on a negatively inclined line, those of a

**pure**common-interestgame by some or all of the points on a positively inclined line. In the mixed game,

...

Page 89

We could stay close to traditional terminology, with respect to the strictly

games, by calling them fixed-sum and fixed-proportions games, getting the

unwieldy variable-sum—variable-proportions as the name for all games except

the ...

We could stay close to traditional terminology, with respect to the strictly

**pure**games, by calling them fixed-sum and fixed-proportions games, getting the

unwieldy variable-sum—variable-proportions as the name for all games except

the ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game