The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 77
... retaliation is left to the method and place of the retaliator's own choosing , it may be much more difficult to convey to the victim what the proposed limits are , so that he has a chance to accept them in his counter- retaliation . In ...
... retaliation is left to the method and place of the retaliator's own choosing , it may be much more difficult to convey to the victim what the proposed limits are , so that he has a chance to accept them in his counter- retaliation . In ...
Page 235
... retaliation . Similarly , a defense of Chicago that requires the enemy to triple the size of his attack may be a poor prospect ; it may mean only that he invests in a larger initial attack . But a defense of our retaliatory force that ...
... retaliation . Similarly , a defense of Chicago that requires the enemy to triple the size of his attack may be a poor prospect ; it may mean only that he invests in a larger initial attack . But a defense of our retaliatory force that ...
Page 254
... retaliatory forces , the threat of limited retaliation may well gain it . Whatever the net effect , we cannot deprecate a world of invulnerable SAC's simply by reference to the need for third - area deterrence ; it has to be ...
... retaliatory forces , the threat of limited retaliation may well gain it . Whatever the net effect , we cannot deprecate a world of invulnerable SAC's simply by reference to the need for third - area deterrence ; it has to be ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game