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But a defense of our retaliatory force that requires the enemy to triple the size of
his attack may substantially increase the ... of Sneaking past our warning system,
and appreciably change his likelihood of successfully precluding retaliation.
If we were to consider eliminating all weapons that had any possible effect
against the other side's retaliatory forces, or that enjoyed any advantage in being
used first, there might not be enough left with which to promise retaliation.
So although we cannot be sure that a deliberate policy of collaborating to make
each side's retaliatory forces invulnerable would make any difference, we have to
consider that it might and to ask ourselves whether in fact we should want a ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
The Retarded Science of International Strategy
2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I
Bargaining Communication and Limited War
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