The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 91
... rules of etiquette and social restraint , including some ( like the rule against ending a sentence with a preposition ) that have been divested of their relevance or authority , seems to depend on their having become " solutions " to a ...
... rules of etiquette and social restraint , including some ( like the rule against ending a sentence with a preposition ) that have been divested of their relevance or authority , seems to depend on their having become " solutions " to a ...
Page 270
... rules of the game and the rationality postulate both players know this . And by the rule of symmetry this moment must be the same for both players . From this follows the significant feature . The last offer that it is mechanically and ...
... rules of the game and the rationality postulate both players know this . And by the rule of symmetry this moment must be the same for both players . From this follows the significant feature . The last offer that it is mechanically and ...
Page 283
... rule of elimination that leads to an unambiguous choice or a high probability of concerted choice . And one of these rules , or clues , or suggestions , is mathematical symmetry.1 16 16 The basic intellectual premise , or working ...
... rule of elimination that leads to an unambiguous choice or a high probability of concerted choice . And one of these rules , or clues , or suggestions , is mathematical symmetry.1 16 16 The basic intellectual premise , or working ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game