The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 78
... side . ) The technical side of this principle would be identification of who would send and receive messages , upon what authority , over what facilities , using what intermediaries if intermediaries were used , and who stood in line to ...
... side . ) The technical side of this principle would be identification of who would send and receive messages , upon what authority , over what facilities , using what intermediaries if intermediaries were used , and who stood in line to ...
Page 237
... side's missiles becomes less and less as the missiles on both sides increase . And the tolerance of the system increases too . For small numbers on both sides , a ratio of 2 or 3 to I may provide dominance to the larger side , a chance ...
... side's missiles becomes less and less as the missiles on both sides increase . And the tolerance of the system increases too . For small numbers on both sides , a ratio of 2 or 3 to I may provide dominance to the larger side , a chance ...
Page 241
... side's retaliatory forces if used first . Perhaps most weapons fall in this category if reasonable precautions are taken for their pro- tection . So we cannot make a nice distinction between first - strike and second - strike weapons ...
... side's retaliatory forces if used first . Perhaps most weapons fall in this category if reasonable precautions are taken for their pro- tection . So we cannot make a nice distinction between first - strike and second - strike weapons ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game