The Strategy of Conflict |
From inside the book
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Page 93
... situation , except insofar as the objective situation may provide some clue for a concerted choice . The analogy is not just trying to vote with the majority but trying to vote with a majority when everyone wants to be in a So is ...
... situation , except insofar as the objective situation may provide some clue for a concerted choice . The analogy is not just trying to vote with the majority but trying to vote with a majority when everyone wants to be in a So is ...
Page 246
... situations in which one's own interest is in letting the truth be known . The difference between these two ... situation in which the apprehension by each side that the other may be about to pre - empt explodes by feedback into ...
... situations in which one's own interest is in letting the truth be known . The difference between these two ... situation in which the apprehension by each side that the other may be about to pre - empt explodes by feedback into ...
Page
... situations against which it is tested are " essentially bargaining situations . " The strategy may be explicit or tacit ... situation involving the interdependent actions of the participants . In the parallel conflicts between parent and ...
... situations against which it is tested are " essentially bargaining situations . " The strategy may be explicit or tacit ... situation involving the interdependent actions of the participants . In the parallel conflicts between parent and ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game