## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 53

Page 116

Von Neumann and Morgenstern illustrated their

sum game with the example of a seller, A, ... The novel part of the

that C might pay B a share of his saving if, through B's staying out of the market ...

Von Neumann and Morgenstern illustrated their

**solution**concept for the nonzero-sum game with the example of a seller, A, ... The novel part of the

**solution**wasthat C might pay B a share of his saving if, through B's staying out of the market ...

Page 271

So, if we assume (for the moment) that the tacit game has a clearly recognized

behavior strategy during the earlier stage. Either can enforce this tacit

...

So, if we assume (for the moment) that the tacit game has a clearly recognized

**solution**, and that the**solution**is efficient, each player has a pure minimaxbehavior strategy during the earlier stage. Either can enforce this tacit

**solution**by...

Page 280

and what they expect is that they both perceive the same

terms the first (explicit) part of the Harsanyi hypothesis might be rephrased: that

there is, in any bargaininggame situation (with perfect information about utilities),

...

and what they expect is that they both perceive the same

**solution**.15 In theseterms the first (explicit) part of the Harsanyi hypothesis might be rephrased: that

there is, in any bargaininggame situation (with perfect information about utilities),

...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game