The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 116
... solution was that C might pay B a share of his saving if , through B's staying out of the market , C got the house for less than 15. They proposed - and this limita- tion was inherent in their concept of solution that the most B might ...
... solution was that C might pay B a share of his saving if , through B's staying out of the market , C got the house for less than 15. They proposed - and this limita- tion was inherent in their concept of solution that the most B might ...
Page 271
... solution , and that the solu- tion is efficient , each player has a pure minimax behavior strategy during the earlier stage . Either can enforce this tacit solution by abstaining from agreement until the warning - bell rings ; neither ...
... solution , and that the solu- tion is efficient , each player has a pure minimax behavior strategy during the earlier stage . Either can enforce this tacit solution by abstaining from agreement until the warning - bell rings ; neither ...
Page 280
... solution . " The second ( implicit ) part of the hypothesis is that the particular outcome so recognized is de- termined by mathematical symmetry . The first we might call the " rational - solution " postulate ; it is the second that ...
... solution . " The second ( implicit ) part of the hypothesis is that the particular outcome so recognized is de- termined by mathematical symmetry . The first we might call the " rational - solution " postulate ; it is the second that ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game