## The Strategy of Conflict |

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Page 223

Actually, as will be seen below, this second examination may be unnecessary; for

certain behavior hypotheses, “optimal” adjustment of R and B (for any value short

of R = 1) requires that the conditions for

Actually, as will be seen below, this second examination may be unnecessary; for

certain behavior hypotheses, “optimal” adjustment of R and B (for any value short

of R = 1) requires that the conditions for

**stability**of the modified matrix be met.Page 225

A

have a product less than 1, that is, that with B, measured vertically and B,

horizontally, C's curve should intersect R's from below. The general “multiplier”

expression ...

A

**stable**equilibrium requires that player R's dB, sq B, and C's dBo/dB, shouldhave a product less than 1, that is, that with B, measured vertically and B,

horizontally, C's curve should intersect R's from below. The general “multiplier”

expression ...

Page 237

capacities of the two enemies, and within these budgetary capacities the number

of missiles is high,

logic of

the ...

capacities of the two enemies, and within these budgetary capacities the number

of missiles is high,

**stability**might be ... But it does demonstrate that, within thelogic of

**stable**deterrence, and of schemes for the prevention of surprise attack,the ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game