The Strategy of Conflict |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 38
Page 162
... structure of the payoff function should not be permitted to dominate the analysis . A second one , somewhat more general , is that there is a danger in too much abstractness : we change the character of the game when we dras- tically ...
... structure of the payoff function should not be permitted to dominate the analysis . A second one , somewhat more general , is that there is a danger in too much abstractness : we change the character of the game when we dras- tically ...
Page 285
... structure of the game but are part of the " topical content " ; that is , they usually depend on the " labeling " of players and strategies , to use the term of Luce and Raiffa mentioned in Chapter 4. ) I have no basis for arguing with ...
... structure of the game but are part of the " topical content " ; that is , they usually depend on the " labeling " of players and strategies , to use the term of Luce and Raiffa mentioned in Chapter 4. ) I have no basis for arguing with ...
Page 296
... structure alone ( that is , without introducing " labels , " prefabri- cated matrices , or any other details outside the pure quantita- tive structure of the game ) , it is hard to see that this solution is much less , if at all less ...
... structure alone ( that is , without introducing " labels , " prefabri- cated matrices , or any other details outside the pure quantita- tive structure of the game ) , it is hard to see that this solution is much less , if at all less ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
10 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game