The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 231
... surprise attack against him if in fact we are not planning any such attack . We are interested not only in assuring ... surprise attack is the fear of being a poor second for not going first . " Self - defense " becomes peculiarly ...
... surprise attack against him if in fact we are not planning any such attack . We are interested not only in assuring ... surprise attack is the fear of being a poor second for not going first . " Self - defense " becomes peculiarly ...
Page 233
... surprise attack have as their most im- mediate objective the safety of weapons rather than the safety of people . Surprise - attack schemes , in contrast to other types of disarmament proposals , are based on deterrence as the fundamen ...
... surprise attack have as their most im- mediate objective the safety of weapons rather than the safety of people . Surprise - attack schemes , in contrast to other types of disarmament proposals , are based on deterrence as the fundamen ...
Page 242
... surprise - attack problem dur- ing the last few years has related to measures that might re- duce the likelihood of surprise , rather than measures to limit what weapons could do if surprise were achieved . The open - skies proposal was ...
... surprise - attack problem dur- ing the last few years has related to measures that might re- duce the likelihood of surprise , rather than measures to limit what weapons could do if surprise were achieved . The open - skies proposal was ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game