The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 278
... symmetry , as does Har- sanyi's . The symmetry postulate is certainly expedient ; it often permits one to find a " solution " to a game and to stay - if he wishes to within the realm of mathematics . There are few similarly potent ...
... symmetry , as does Har- sanyi's . The symmetry postulate is certainly expedient ; it often permits one to find a " solution " to a game and to stay - if he wishes to within the realm of mathematics . There are few similarly potent ...
Page 281
... symmetry part of the defini- tion of rationality ; to do so would destroy the empirical relevance of the theory and simply make symmetry an independent axiom . We must have a plausible definition of rationality that does not mention ...
... symmetry part of the defini- tion of rationality ; to do so would destroy the empirical relevance of the theory and simply make symmetry an independent axiom . We must have a plausible definition of rationality that does not mention ...
Page 285
... symmetry does dominate " rational expectations . " But I think that the status of the sym- metry postulate is qualitatively changed by the admission that symmetry has competitors in the role of focussing expectations . For , if it were ...
... symmetry does dominate " rational expectations . " But I think that the status of the sym- metry postulate is qualitatively changed by the admission that symmetry has competitors in the role of focussing expectations . For , if it were ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game