## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 69

The outcome may not be so much conspicuously fair or conspicuously in balance

with estimated bargaining powers as just ... If all this is correct, as it seems

frequently to the author to be, our analysis of

an ...

The outcome may not be so much conspicuously fair or conspicuously in balance

with estimated bargaining powers as just ... If all this is correct, as it seems

frequently to the author to be, our analysis of

**tacit bargaining**may help to providean ...

Page 72

If all we had to reason from were the logic of

guess and perhaps a wild one that the same kind of psychic attraction worked in

explicit bargaining; and if all we had to generalize from were the observation of ...

If all we had to reason from were the logic of

**tacit bargaining**, it would be only aguess and perhaps a wild one that the same kind of psychic attraction worked in

explicit bargaining; and if all we had to generalize from were the observation of ...

Page 101

One, which was discussed in Chapter 3 is that

analytical model—perhaps only an analogy but perhaps an identification of the

actual psychic and intellectual phenomenon — of the “rational” process of finding

...

One, which was discussed in Chapter 3 is that

**tacit bargaining**provides ananalytical model—perhaps only an analogy but perhaps an identification of the

actual psychic and intellectual phenomenon — of the “rational” process of finding

...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game