The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 36
... threat , if he thinks the threat may be successful , because the threat and not its ful- fillment gains the end ; and fulfillment is not required if the threat succeeds . The more certain the contingent fulfillment is , the less likely ...
... threat , if he thinks the threat may be successful , because the threat and not its ful- fillment gains the end ; and fulfillment is not required if the threat succeeds . The more certain the contingent fulfillment is , the less likely ...
Page 125
... threat to make , by confining their brief discussion to 2 X 2 matrices . It is impossible to show , with a 2 X 2 matrix , a game in which both players could be interested in making threats . A threat is essentially a credible ...
... threat to make , by confining their brief discussion to 2 X 2 matrices . It is impossible to show , with a 2 X 2 matrix , a game in which both players could be interested in making threats . A threat is essentially a credible ...
Page 130
... threat than Column would be hurt if , instead , Col- umn had made his threat . Actually , in the particular payoff matrix shown , Row's successful threat is one that would hurt him more in the fulfilment than it would hurt Column ...
... threat than Column would be hurt if , instead , Col- umn had made his threat . Actually , in the particular payoff matrix shown , Row's successful threat is one that would hurt him more in the fulfilment than it would hurt Column ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game