The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 40
... threatened party is the inability of the threaten- ing party to rationalize his way out of his commitment once it has failed its purpose . Any loopholes the threatening party leaves himself , if they are visible to the threatened party ...
... threatened party is the inability of the threaten- ing party to rationalize his way out of his commitment once it has failed its purpose . Any loopholes the threatening party leaves himself , if they are visible to the threatened party ...
Page 51
... threaten to choose B rather than B in game 6 , unless North chose A rather than a in game 5 ; alterna- tively , North could threaten a in game 6 unless East chose ẞ in game 5. Assuming the intervals large enough in game 6 , and the ...
... threaten to choose B rather than B in game 6 , unless North chose A rather than a in game 5 ; alterna- tively , North could threaten a in game 6 unless East chose ẞ in game 5. Assuming the intervals large enough in game 6 , and the ...
Page 177
... threaten to blow us both to bits when it would have been sufficient to threaten our discomfort , you'll likely still comply ; since I have neither to discomfort us nor to kill us , the error costs nothing . If all I had was a grenade to ...
... threaten to blow us both to bits when it would have been sufficient to threaten our discomfort , you'll likely still comply ; since I have neither to discomfort us nor to kill us , the error costs nothing . If all I had was a grenade to ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game