The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 117
... tion that B makes a pure bargaining profit in connection with an object that he never owns before or after ) cannot counterfeit . There are undoubtedly special cases in which one can suppose that the other player is like one's self in ...
... tion that B makes a pure bargaining profit in connection with an object that he never owns before or after ) cannot counterfeit . There are undoubtedly special cases in which one can suppose that the other player is like one's self in ...
Page 141
... tion and exchange , namely , the enormous potential for destruc- tion that is available and that is relevant because of the extor- tionate threats that could be supported by it . The ordinary healthy high - school graduate , of slightly ...
... tion and exchange , namely , the enormous potential for destruc- tion that is available and that is relevant because of the extor- tionate threats that could be supported by it . The ordinary healthy high - school graduate , of slightly ...
Page 158
... tion character of the game remains ; the threat , like the uncon- ditional commitment or like the broader concept of " reaction function " when many choices of action are available , works by constraining another player's expectations ...
... tion character of the game remains ; the threat , like the uncon- ditional commitment or like the broader concept of " reaction function " when many choices of action are available , works by constraining another player's expectations ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game