The Strategy of Conflict |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 29
Page 6
... tive for our purpose . It is a dozen years since deterrence was ar- ticulated as the keystone of our national strategy , and during those years the concept has been refined and improved . We have learned that a threat has to be credible ...
... tive for our purpose . It is a dozen years since deterrence was ar- ticulated as the keystone of our national strategy , and during those years the concept has been refined and improved . We have learned that a threat has to be credible ...
Page 246
... tive way , by an absence of positive evidence to the contrary ; the other scheme relies on positive evidence , and is pertinent to the particular situations in which one's own interest is in letting the truth be known . The difference ...
... tive way , by an absence of positive evidence to the contrary ; the other scheme relies on positive evidence , and is pertinent to the particular situations in which one's own interest is in letting the truth be known . The difference ...
Page 254
... tive role that provides some basis for a deterrent threat . While the threat of all - out punishment may lose credibility with the achievement of invulnerability by both sides ' retaliatory forces , the threat of limited retaliation may ...
... tive role that provides some basis for a deterrent threat . While the threat of all - out punishment may lose credibility with the achievement of invulnerability by both sides ' retaliatory forces , the threat of limited retaliation may ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
10 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game