The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 16
... value system forces us to think more thoroughly about the meaning of " irrationality . " Decision - makers are not simply distributed along a one - dimensional scale that stretches from complete rationality at one end to complete ir ...
... value system forces us to think more thoroughly about the meaning of " irrationality . " Decision - makers are not simply distributed along a one - dimensional scale that stretches from complete rationality at one end to complete ir ...
Page 116
... value system " is contained on cards or chips , he may simply turn them face up ( if the rules permit or if he and his adversary can jointly cheat against the referee ) . In a society that believes absolutely in a superior power that ...
... value system " is contained on cards or chips , he may simply turn them face up ( if the rules permit or if he and his adversary can jointly cheat against the referee ) . In a society that believes absolutely in a superior power that ...
Page 117
... value system with some truth , although each can also gain by deceiving . While one's maneuvers are not un- ambiguous in their revelation of one's value systems and may even be deliberately deceptive , they nevertheless have an evi ...
... value system with some truth , although each can also gain by deceiving . While one's maneuvers are not un- ambiguous in their revelation of one's value systems and may even be deliberately deceptive , they nevertheless have an evi ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game