The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 46
... yields , or may seem to yield , about one's eagerness . But if each has visible reason to expect the other to meet him half way , because of a history of successful bargaining , that very history provides pro- tection against the ...
... yields , or may seem to yield , about one's eagerness . But if each has visible reason to expect the other to meet him half way , because of a history of successful bargaining , that very history provides pro- tection against the ...
Page 176
... yield the other full knowledge . Arms - control agreements , for ex- ample , might have to be monitored by a ... yielding so much that the possibility of successful surprise attack on those forces were greatly enhanced . But the main ...
... yield the other full knowledge . Arms - control agreements , for ex- ample , might have to be monitored by a ... yielding so much that the possibility of successful surprise attack on those forces were greatly enhanced . But the main ...
Page 292
... yields a pair of payoffs that are not both inferior to the payoffs in some other cell . Equilibrium pairs are equivalent if , for each player separately , they yield equal payoffs ; equilib- rium pairs are interchangeable if all pairs ...
... yields a pair of payoffs that are not both inferior to the payoffs in some other cell . Equilibrium pairs are equivalent if , for each player separately , they yield equal payoffs ; equilib- rium pairs are interchangeable if all pairs ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game