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c H. A. P. marcand, were alone reserved in the general mas
sacre; and, after a period of seven centuries, Damascus was reduced to ashes, because a Tartar was moved by religious zeal to avenge the blood of an Arab. The losses and fatigues of the campaign obliged Timour to renounce the conquest of Palestine and Egypt; but in his return to the Euphrates, he delivered Aleppo to the flames; and justified his pious motive by the pardon and reward of two thousand sectaries of Ali, who were desirous to visit the tomb of his son. I have expatiated on the personal anecdotes which mark the character of the Mogul here; but I shall briefly mention *, that he erected on the ruins of Bagdad a pyramid of ninety thousand heads; again visited Georgia; encamped on the banks of Araxes; and proclaimed his resolution of marching against the Ottoman Emperor. Conscious of the importance of the war, he collected his forces from every province; eight hundred thousand men were enrolled on his military list f ;
* The marches and occupations of Timour between the Syrian and Ottoman wars, are represented by Sherefeddin (l. v. c. 29–43.), and Arabsbah (tom. ii. c. 15–18.).
+ This number of 8co, ooo was extracted by Arabshah, or rather by Ebn Schounah, ex rationario Timuri, on the faith of a Carizmian officer, (tom. i. c. 68. p. 617.); and it is reanarkable enough, that a Greek historian (Phranza, 1. i. c. 29.) adds no more than 20,&co men. Poggius reckons 1,000,oco; another Latin contemporary, (Chion. Tarvisianum, apud Muratori, tom. xix. p. 8oo.), 1,coo, coo; and the enormous sum of 1.6cc,cco, is attested by a German soldier, who was present at the battle of Angora, (Leunclav. ad Chalcondyl. l. iii. p. 82.). Timour, in his Institutions, has not origord to calculate his troops, his subjects, or his revenues.
but the splendid commands of five and ten thousand horse, may be rather expressive of the rank and pension of the chiefs, than of the genuine number of effective soldiers". In the pillage of Syria, the Moguls had acquired immense riches; but the delivery of their pay and arrears for seven years, more firmly attached them to the Imperial standard. During this diversion of the Mogul arms, Bajazet had two years to collect his forces for a more serious encounter. They consisted of four hundred thousand horse and foot t, whose merit and fidelity were of an unequal complexion. We may discriminate the Janizaries, who have been gradually raised to an establishment of forty thousand men; a national cavalry, the Saphis of modern times; twenty thousand cuirassiers of Europe, clad in black and impenetrable armour; the troops of Anatolia, whose princes had taken refuge in the camp of Timour, and a colony of Tartars, whom he had driven from Kipzak, and to whom Bajazet had assigned a settlement in the plains of Adrianople. The fearless confidence of the Sultan urged him to meet his antagonist; and, as if he had chosen that spot for revenge, he displayed his banners near the ruins of the unfortuInate
* A wide latitude of non-effectives was allowed by the Great Mogul for his own pride and the benefit of his officers. Bernier's patron was Penge-Hazari, commander of 5ooo horse, of which he maintained no more than 500, (Voyages, tom. i.
+ Timour himself fixes at 4co,oco men the Ottoman army, (Institutions, p. 153.), which is reduced to 150,000 by Phranza, (l. i. c. 29.), and swelled by the German soldier to 1,400,oco. It is evident that the Moguls were the more mumerous.
nate Suvas. In the mean while, Timour moved from the Araxes through the countries of Armenia and Anatolia: his boldness was secured by the wisest precautions; his speed was guided by order and discipline; and the woods, the mountains, and the rivers, were diligently explored by the flying squadrons, who marked his road, and preceded his standard. Firm in his plan of fighting in the heart of the Ottoman kingdom, he avoided their camp; dextrously inclined to the left; occupied Caesarea; traversed the salt desart and the river Halys; and invested Angora; while the Sultan, immoveable and ignorant in his post, compared the Tartar swiftness to the crawling of a snail ". He returned on the wings of indignation to the relief of Angora; and as both generals were alike impatient for action, the plains round that city were the scene of a memorable battle, which has immortalized the glory of Timour and the shame of Bajazet. For this signal victory, the Mogul Emperor was indebted to himself, to the genius of the moment, and the discipline of thirty years. He had improved the tactics, without violating the manners, of his nation f, whose force still consisted in the missile weapons, and rapid evolutions, of a numerous cavalry. * It may not be useless to mark the distances between Angora and the neighbouring sities, by the journies of the caravans, each of twenty or twenty-five miles; to Smyrna 20, to Kiotahia Io, to Boursa 10, to Caesarea 8, to Sinope Io, to
Nicomedia 9, to Constantinople 12 or 13, (see Tournefort,
+ See the Systems of Tactics in the Institutions, which the English editors have illustrated with elaborate plans, (p. 373 –407.),
valry. From a single troop to a great army, the cII A P.
mode of attack was the same ; a foremost line first advanced to the charge, and was supported in a just order by the squadrons of the great vanguard. The general's eye watched over the field, and at his command the front and rear of the right and left wings successively moved forwards in their several divisions, and in a direct or oblique line; the enemy was pressed by eighteen or twenty attacks; and each attack afforded a chance of victory. If they all proved fruitless or unsuccessful, the occasion was worthy of the Emperor himself, who gave the signal of advancing to the standard and main body, which he led in person *. But in the
battle of Angora, the main body itself was sup
ported, on the flanks and in the rear, by the bravest squadrons of the reserve, commanded by the sons and grandsons of Timour. The conqueror of Hindostan ostentatiously shewed a line of elephants, the trophies, rather than the instruments, of victory: the use of the Greek fire was familiar to the Moguls and Ottomans; but had they borrowed from Europe the recent invention of gunpowder and cannon, the artificial thunder, in the hands of either nation, must have turned the fortune of the day f. In that day, Bajazet displayed the quali
* The Sultan himself (says Timour) must then put the foot of courage into the stirrup of patience. A Tartar metaphor, which is lost in the English, but preserved in the French, version of the Institutes, (p. 156. 157.).
+ The Greek fire, on Timour's side, is attested by Sherefeddin, (1. v. c. 47.); but Voltaire's strange suspicion, that some cannon, inscribed with strange characters, must have been sent by that monarch to Delhi, is refuted by the universal silence of contemporaries.
ties of a soldier and a chief; but his genius sunk under a stronger ascendant; and from various motives, the greatest part of his troops failed him in the decisive moment. His rigour and avarice had provoked a mutiny among the Turks; and even his son Soliman too hastily withdrew from the field. The forces of Anatolia, loyal in their revolt, were drawn away to the banners of their lawful princes. His Tartar allies had been tempted by the letters and emissaries of Timour “; who reproached their ignoble servitude under the slaves of their fathers; and offered to their hopes the dominion of their new, or the liberty of their ancient country. In the right wing of Bajazet, the cuirassiers of Europe charged with faithful hearts and irresistable arms; but these men of iron were soon broken by an artful flight and headlong pursuit; and the Janizaries, alone, without cavalry or missile weapons, were encompassed by the circle of the Mogul hunters. Their valour was at length oppressed by heat, thirst, and the weight of numbers; and the unfortunate Sultan, afflicted with the gout in his hands and feet, was transported from the field on the fleetest of his horses. He was pursued and taken by the titular Khan of Zagatai; and after his capture, and the defeat of the Ottoman powers, the kingdom of Anatolia
and captivity of Bajazct.
* Timour has dissembled this secret and important negociation with the Tartars, which is indisputably proved by the #. evidence of the Arabian (tom. i. c.47. p. 391.), Tur
ish (Annal. Leunclav. p. 321.), and Persian historians (Khondemir, apud d'Herbelot, p. 882.).