5. When a party nesses. person shall be excluded from giving evidence by reason of incapacity from crime or interest-is all evidence of his being interested to be excluded from the view of the jury?" This suggestion does not however appear to be followed in practice. 615. 5. It is an established rule that a party shall not be allowed to give general evidence to discredit his own witness, i. e. general evidence that he is unworthy of belief on his oath. By calling the witness, a party represents him to the court as worthy of credit, or at least not so infamous as to be wholly unworthy of it; and the afterwards attacking his general character for veracity is not only mala fides towards the tribunal, but, say the books, "would enable him to destroy the witness if he spoke against him, and to make him a good witness if he spoke for him, with the means in his hand of destroying his credit if he spoke against him (u)." But a party may discredit his own witness collaterally by adducing evidence to shew that the evidence which he has given is untrue in fact (x). This does not raise the slightest presumption of mala fides, and it would be in the highest degree unjust and absurd if parties were bound by the unfavourable statements of witnesses with whom they may have no privity, and are called by them from pure necessity. But whether it is competent for a party to shew that his own witness has made 17/18 bich: 125:12 statements out of court inconsistent with his evidence is a point at present unsettled, although the weight of authority is in favour of the negative (y). On the one hand it is urged, that this falls within the principle of the general rule that a party must not be allowed (u) B. N. P. 297; 2 Phill. Ev. (r) 2 Ph. Ev. 526, 10th Ed. Tayl. Ev. § 1049; 2 Ph. Ev. 528 et seq. 10th Ed.; and Melhuish v. Collier, 15 Q. B. 878. directly to discredit his own witness (z); that to admit proof of contradictory statements would tend to multiply issues; that it would enable a party to get the naked statement of a witness before the jury, operating in fact as substantive evidence (a); that there would be great danger of collusion and dishonest contrivance, inasmuch as a witness might be induced to make a statement out of court for the very purpose of its being reserved and afterwards used in contradiction to him (b). Moreover, the use of oaths and the other sanctions of truth is to extract facts which parties might be willing to conceal, and the allowing a witness to be thus contradicted holds out an inducement to him to maintain by perjury in court any false or hasty statements he may have made out of it. The following reasoning on the other side is taken from a work of authority (c). "It may be argued the evidence is not open to the objection, that the party would thus discredit his own witness by general testimony; that although a party, who calls a person of bad character as witness, knowing him to be such, ought not be allowed to defeat his testimony because it turns out unfavourable to him, by direct proof of general bad character, yet it is only just that he should be permitted to shew, if he can, that the evidence has taken him by surprise, and is contrary to the examination of the witness, preparatory to the trial; that this course is necessary, as a security against the contrivance of an artful witness, who otherwise might recommend himself to a party by the promise of favourable evidence, (being really in the interest of the opposite party), and afterwards by hostile evidence ruin his cause; that the rule, with the above exception, as to offering contradictory evidence, ought to be the same, whether the witness is called by the one party or the other, and (z) Ph. & Am. Ev. 904. (a) Tayl. Ev. § 1048. (b) Ph. & Am. Ev. 904. 6. Proof of documents. R. G. H. 4 that the danger of the jury's treating the contradictory matter as substantive testimony, is the same in both cases; that, as to the supposed danger of collusion, it is extremely improbable, and would be easily detected. It may be further remarked, that this is a question, in which not only the interests of litigating parties are involved, but also the more important general interests of truth, in criminal as well as in civil proceedings; that the ends of justice are best attained, by allowing a free and ample scope for scrutinizing evidence and estimating its real value; and that in the administration of criminal justice, more especially, the exclusion of the proof of contrary statements might be attended with the worst consequences." Besides, it by no means follows that the object of a party in contradicting his own witness is to impeach his veracity—it may be to shew the faultiness of his memory (d). § 616. 6. The expense of proving documents, especially such as are formal in their nature, and not likely to be made the subject of dispute, was long felt a grievance. For remedy the R. G. H. 4 Will. IV. (Rule 20, Practice) (e) directs, that "Either party, after plea pleaded, and a reasonable time before trial, may give notice to the other, either in town or country (in the form thereto annexed, or to the like effect) of his intention to adduce in evidence certain written or printed documents; and unless the adverse party shall consent by indorsement on such notice, within forty-eight hours, to make the admission specified, the party requiring such admission may call on the party required by summons, to shew cause before a judge why he should not consent to such admission, or, in case of refusal, be subject to pay the costs of proof. And unless (d) Tayl. Ev. § 1047. (e) Jervis' Rules, 110—111, 4th Ed. the party required shall expressly consent to make such admission, the judge shall, if he think the application reasonable, make an order, that the costs of proving any document specified in the notice, which shall be proved at the trial to the satisfaction of the judge or other presiding officer, certified by his indorsement thereon, shall be paid by the party so required, whatever may be the result of the cause. Provided, that if the judge shall think the application unreasonable, he shall indorse the summons accordingly. Provided also, that the judge may give such time for inquiry or examination of the documents intended to be offered in evidence, and give such directions for inspection and examination, and impose such terms upon the party requiring the admission, as he shall think fit. If the party required shall consent to the admission, the judge shall order the same to be made. No costs of proving any written or printed document shall be allowed to any party who shall have adduced the same in evidence on any trial, unless he shall have given such notice as aforesaid, and the adverse party shall have refused or neglected to make such admission, or the judge shall have indorsed upon the summons that he does not think it reasonable to require it. A judge may make such order as he may think fit respecting the costs of the application, and the costs of the production and inspection, and in the absence of a special order the same shall be costs in the cause." An alteration has been effected by the Common Law 15 & 16 Vict. Procedure Act, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, which enacts as follows with respect to the admission of documents: "Sect. 117. Either party may call on the other party by notice to admit any document, saving all just exceptions; and in case of refusal or neglect to admit, the costs of proving the document shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the cause may be, unless at the trial the judge shall certify that the c. 76. R. G. H. 16 refusal to admit was reasonable; and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice be given, except in cases where the omission to give the notice is in the opinion of the master a saving of expense. "Sect. 118. An affidavit of the attorney in the cause, or his clerk, of the due signature of any admissions made in pursuance of such notice, and annexed to the affidavit, shall be in all cases sufficient evidence of such admissions. "Sect. 119. An affidavit of the attorney in the cause, or his clerk, of the service of any notice to produce, in respect of which notice to admit shall have been given, and of the time when it was served, with a copy of such notice to produce annexed to such affidavit, shall be sufficient evidence of the service of the original of such notice, and of the time when it was served." Under this statute certain rules were framed by the judges, which came into operation on the 1st day of H. T. 16 Vict. One of which, the 29th, is as follows:"The form of notice to admit documents referred to in the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 117, may be as follows: poses to adduce in evidence the several documents here under specified, and that the same may be inspected by is hereby required, within forty-eight hours from the lastmentioned hour, to admit that such of the said documents as are specified to be originals were respectively written, |