else and not for himself, but for you who have the power of speaking and gaining the ear of the multitudes.

Soc. Now, Gorgias, I think you have come very near c. 8. to an explanation of what you understand by the art of rhetoric, and, if I at all enter into your meaning, you define 453 rhetoric to be the artificer of persuasion, and you say that its entire business and the whole sum and substance of it results in this. Or have you any power to mention that rhetoric possesses beyond that of producing persuasion in the minds of the hearers?

Gor. None at all, Socrates; your definition seems to me to be sufficient; this is no doubt the sum and substance of it.

Soc. Then listen to me, Gorgias. I flatter myself, you may be quite sure, that if there be any one else' in the whole world that engages in a discussion from a genuine desire to know just what the argument is about and no more, I too am one of that sort; and I make no doubt that you are another.

Gor. Well, what then, Socrates?

Soc. I'll tell you directly. What your view is of the exact nature of the persuasion produced by rhetoric, and of the subjects to which it is applied, I assure you I by no means clearly understand; though at the same time I have a kind of suspicion of what I suppose you to mean by it, and what it deals with. Still I will ask you nevertheless what you do mean by the persuasion that proceeds from rhetoric, and what are the objects on which it is exercised.

1 The word 'else,' just like the Greek &λos, with which it may be etymologically connected, as well as 'other' 'the rest' and so on, are frequently found in the best English writers where they are redundant or involve a logical and grammatical inconsistency. I have elsewhere quoted Macbeth, 'Of all men else I have avoided thee.'

The explanation of this logical blunder, and the false grammar which expresses it, in the two classes of idioms in which it appears in Greek, I reserve for a more appropriate occasion than that which is offered by the notes to a mere translation.

Now why when I have a suspicion about the matter myself am I going to ask you instead of myself stating it? It is not on your account (not to refute or annoy you), but for the sake of the argument, that it may proceed in such a way as may make the subject of our conversation most clear to us. For see now if you don't think I am right in repeating my question. Take a parallel case. If my question had been, to what class of painters does Zeuxis belong? had you replied, he is a figure-painter, would it not have been quite fair in me to ask you, what sort of figures he paints, and on what occasions?

Gor. Quite so.

Soc. And is not the reason this, that there are besides him other painters employed upon a number of other figures?

Soc. But if no one else were a painter but Zeuxis, your answer would have been right enough?

Gor. Of course it would.

Soc. Well then tell me about rhetoric in the same way; whether it is your opinion that rhetoric is the only art that produces persuasion, or others besides it. What I mean is something of this sort: when any one teaches anything, does he persuade in teaching it? or do you think otherwise?

Gor. Certainly not, Socrates; on the contrary, he most assuredly does persuade.

Soc. And again, if we apply our question to the same arts as we mentioned just now, does not numeration, or the man conversant with that science, teach us all the properties of number?

Gor. Yes, no doubt.

Soc. And so likewise persuades?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Then numeration also is an artificer of persuasion?
Gor. It seems so.

Soc.

So then if we are asked what kind of persuasion

and what about, we shall reply I presume, that which conveys instruction, which deals with the amounts of all 454 the odd and even numbers. And we shall be able to show that all the rest of the arts that we were just now referring to are artificers of persuasion, and what that is, and what it is about. Shan't we?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. It follows that rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion.

Gor. True.

Soc. Since then it is not the only one that effects c. 9. this object, but others besides it, we should be entitled next to put a further question to the speaker, as we did in the case of the painter, What sort of persuasion then is it of which rhetoric is the art, and what is that persuasion about? You think it would be fair, don't you, to put such a further question?

Gor. Oh, yes.

Soc. Answer me then, Gorgias, since you agree with me in this view.

Gor. Well then I mean that kind of persuasion, Socrates, which is exercised in law-courts and any other great crowds, as indeed I said just now; and it is about everything that is just and unjust.

Soc. I had a suspicion myself, to tell you the truth, Gorgias, that that was the kind of persuasion you meant, and that those were its objects: but that you may not be surprised if I ask you by and by some such question as seems to be quite clear, though I repeat it-for, as I say, I do so in order that our argument may be brought regularly to a conclusion; not on your account (for the pleasure of annoying or refuting you), but that we may not get into the habit of snatching up an over-hasty conclusion as to one another's meaning founded on a mere guess, but that you may state your views as you think fit according to your own notions.

Gor. Indeed, Socrates, in my opinion you are doing quite right.

Soc. Come then, let this be the next thing we examine. There is such a thing as what you call 'to have learnt'?

Gor. There is.

Soc. And again 'to have believed'?

Gor. Oh, yes.

Soc. Do you think then to have learnt and to have believed, and learning and believing, are the same thing, or something different?

Gor. Different, I should think, Socrates.

Soc. And quite right too: and you may be sure of it from this. If you were asked, Is there such a thing, Gorgias, as false as well as true belief? you would say yes, I presume.

Gor. I should.

Soc. But again, is there false as well as true knowledge?
Gor. Certainly not.

Soc. To be sure, because it plainly appears a second time that they are not identical'.

Gor. True.

Soc. But still those that have learnt are persuaded, as well as those that have believed.

Gor. It is so.

Soc. Would you have us then assume two forms of persuasion, the one conveying belief without knowledge, the other knowledge?

Gor. Yes, by all means.

Soc. Then which of the two kinds of persuasion is it that rhetoric effects in law-courts or any other large assemblies on the subject of right and wrong? Is it that

1 In this sentence yap has reference to Gorgias' decided ovdaμŵs. 'You deny it so readily and so positively, because, here again, by this second process (a), it is quite plain that they are not the same.'

which gives rise to belief without knowledge, or that from which knowledge springs?

Gor.

to belief.

Plainly, of course, Socrates, that which gives rise

Soc. Rhetoric then, it seems, is an artificer of persuasion 455 productive of belief but not of instruction in matters of right and wrong.

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Nor consequently is the rhetorician qualified to instruct law-courts or any other large masses of people on questions of right and wrong, but only to persuade them. For surely he never could be able to instruct such a great crowd in things of such importance in a few minutes.

Gor. Certainly not.

Soc. Come, then, let us see what we do actually mean c. 10. by rhetoric: for to tell you the truth, I can't yet distinctly make out even myself what my own opinion is. Whenever the city holds a meeting for the election of state-physicians or shipwrights or any other class of craftsmen, will not on such occasions the rhetorician refrain from offering his advice? plainly because in every election we are bound to choose the most skilful practitioner. Or, again, as to the building of walls, or the construction of harbours or docks, it is not he that will give advice, but the master-builders. Or, again, when advice is to be given upon the election of generals, or the disposition of troops to meet an enemy, or the occupation of military positions, on such occasions it is the military men that will advise, and not the rhetoricians. Or what say you, Gorgias, to such cases? For as you profess to be a speaker yourself and to qualify others for speaking, it is right to learn your opinion upon the matters of your own art. So pray suppose that I am acting now with a view to your interests. For very likely one of the present company here may be desirous of becoming a pupil of yours—as in fact I think I see some, and I dare say a good many-who perhaps might be ashamed to trouble you with repeated