private and public life; that if a man become bad in any respect, he is to be corrected; and that this is good in the second degree, next to being just to become so, and to be corrected by punishment: and that all kinds of 'flattery,' whether of oneself or others, of few or of many, are to be avoided: and that rhetoric, as well as every other kind of action, is to be employed ever for the maintenance of the right, and for that alone (ouтws). So take my advice and follow me to that bourn, where c. 83 when you have attained it, you will be happy in life and after death, as our argument promises, and let any one look down upon you as a fool and insult you if he pleases—aye, by heaven, and cheerfully submit to endure from him even that blow of infamy: for it will do you no harm if you be really an honest and true man, practising virtue. And hereafter when we have so practised it together, then and not till then will we set about politics, if it seem right to do so, or consult then about any other plans we think proper, better prepared for deliberation than we are now. For it is a shame for men in the condition in which we now manifestly are to assume airs of consequence, though we are never of the same mind for two moments together upon the same subjects, and those of the deepest moment; such is the undisciplined state of our minds. Let us then take as a guide the views that have even now declared themselves to us, which point out that this course of life is best, in the practice of justice and of every other virtue to live and to die. These then let us follow and invite all others thereto; not those you put faith in and invite me to: for they are nothing worth, Callicles. ADDENDUM to note (2) p. 98. 'Unhappy,' is another English word which "unites the meanings of wicked and miserable"; as Trench notes in his Select Glossary, p. 220, illustrating the former by quotations from our earlier writers. 'Unlucky' has the same double meaning. And similarly 'poor rogue, poor devil,' are often employed, without intending thereby to impute to the persons so designated any other crimes but those of misfortune or misery. Another remarkable example of this association or confusion of physical and moral good and evil appears in the modern application of the English villain, and the French vilain, which have transferred to the signification of moral depravity in the former case, and of all that is mean and contemptible including even personal ugliness in the latter, a term which originally marked the low servile condition of the adscripti glebæ under the Feudal system. The moral application of the word 'base' seems to be similarly derived. The exact converse of this is shown in the identification of high social rank and position with moral worth in the names ἀγαθοί, ἄριστοι, ἀριστῆες, in the earlier Greek authors, and κaλoí, kảyaboí, èmieɩkeîs in the later; of optimates, boni, optimi, by the Latins; and Gute Männer, Herrn von Rechte, and similar terms by the old Germans; which are bestowed upon the nobility, the men of rank and wealth, of the highest social and political importance in the state. See more on this latter subject in Donaldson's New Cratylus, §§ 321-327, and Welcker, Theognis, Introd. p. xxi foll to which Dr Donaldson refers. The explanation however of this association or transfer which he gives seems hardly correct. The 'virtue' which is ascribed to the higher classes in the early and half-civilized times in which these terms originated is of a different kind to that more compre 133 hensive sort which is afterwards understood under the same name. This is apparently overlooked by Dr Donaldson when he says, Art. 327, "it was because the better classes, having no temptations like their poorer brethren, abstained from those vices which common opinion reprobated, that their regular name became an epithet descriptive of good moral conduct." This no doubt would help to fix such a designation upon them: but the aperý, or virtus, which was ascribed to them was above all others the martial prowess in which their wealth and consequent superiority in arms and armour over the less favoured classes, and the leisure for the cultivation of military habits and exercises which it allowed, enabled them actually to excel: whilst the same circumstances would admit and encourage the exercise of generosity, liberality, courtesy, affability, and those other shining qualities by which especially in rude and simple times the popular imagination is most captivated. APPENDIX. NOTE A. CALLICLES' bad memory has here deprived us of the true reading of an interesting fragment of Euripides. The interpretation and restoration of this much vexed passage are alike doubtful. As to the former, Stallbaum construes diamρéπeis in a neuter sense, indolem animi adeo generosam puerili conspicuus es decore; but I think such a construction is far too awkward to be found in a writer celebrated for the neatness of his style like Euripides; and that we ought certainly to give the verb a transitive sense, 'make conspicuous.' Next, it appears from the general tenor of the passage, and from the adverb aioxpŵs, which is attached to Siamρéreis by Philostratus in a reference to be cited below, that the word has an unfavourable sense, and implies a disgraceful notoriety; alioxp@s diamрéreis being, turpiter insignem reddis: whence it may be translated 'disfigure' or 'disgrace.' Valckenaer actually proposes diaσrpépes, and Heindorf, who thinks Stampéres corrupt, hesitates whether to accept this inexcusable false quantity or Grotius' vox nihili, Starρéreis. As regards the restoration of the verses, we are told by Olympiodorus in his commentary that the word μeipakide is substituted by Plato for yuvaukude in the original. The more probable reading yuvaikoμíu is supplied by a quotation in Philostratus' life of Apollonius of Tyana, iv. 21, p. 160, referred to by Grotius, yuvaκομίμῳ μορφώματι κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην αἰσχρῶς διαπρέπειν. It would seem from this latter passage that aloxpôs likewise stood in Euripides' text- -a word which may be thought almost necessary to qualify the favourable sense which is elsewhere attached to Siamρérev. Valckenaer's restoration, which Stallbaum unsuspiδιαπρέπειν. cious of the violation of metre reproduces without remark in his note, as Heindorf had done before him, is as follows; Αμφιον ἀμελεῖς ὧν ἐπιμελεῖσθαί σε δεῖ· γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι. in which, besides the metrical objection, the phrase ψυχῆς...φύσις as an apposition to σύ the suppressed nominative to διαπρέπεις, seems to me quite un-Euripidean. I had thought of the following: αἰσχρῶς τε τῆς σῆς ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν ψυχῆς γυναικῶν διαπρέπεις μορφώματι. To this reading of course the words of Philostratus are opposed, supposing them to be a direct and literal quotation. Yet such a supposition is by no means necessary, for they do not run in verse; or again the author may have been quoting from memory, in which case the compound γυναικομίμος, which occurs in all three tragedians, might very naturally suggest itself as the more poetical representative of γυναικών. Nauck, Trag. Græc. Fragm. p. 329, substitutes ὧν σε φροντίζειν ἐχρῆν for ὧν ἐπιμελεῖσθαί σε δεῖ, apparently because he thinks it is more poetical. If that be his reason, he might have remembered that the language of Euripides is often so familiar as nearly to approach that of every-day life; and also that the poet employs the word himself in Phan. 559. Besides this, the apparently intentional opposition between ἀμελεῖν and ἐπιμελεῖσθαι seems to vindicate the claim of the latter to a place in the text of Euripides. Of Nauck's reading of the second line, ψυχῆς ἔχων γὰρ ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν, I need say nothing τοῖς συνετοῖσιν. Valckenaer's restoration of the next line runs thus; οὔτ ̓ ἐν δίκης βουλαῖσιν ὀρθῶς ἂν λόγον The words οὔτ ̓ ἂν ἀσπίδος—ὁμιλήσειας are adapted from another hint of Olympiodorus. This likewise is open to the objection that it omits the word λάβοις, which certainly would not have been chosen here by Plato, and therefore probably belongs to Euripides. It would be easy to express the whole of this clause in a verse such as οὔτ ̓ εἰκὸς οὖν (οι ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν οὐδὲν ἂν λάβοις, |