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in the same way about rhetoric again; what are the things to which its knowledge is applied?

Gor. To words.

Soc. To what sort of words, Gorgias? Do you mean those that point out by what course of treatment the sick may recover their health?

Gor. No.

Soc. Then rhetoric does not deal with all words.

Gor. Certainly not.

Soc. But still it makes men able to speak.

Gor. Yes.

Soc.

Gor.

And to understand what they talk about as well?
Of course it does.

Soc. Well, but doesn't the art we were just now speaking of, medicine I mean, make men able to understand as well as to speak about the sick?

Gor. Necessarily.

Soc. Then medicine too, it seems, deals with words?
Gor. Yes.

Soc. Those which are about diseases?

Gor. Precisely.

Soc. Well and doesn't the gymnastic art too deal with words, those namely which relate to the good and bad condition of bodies?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And moreover the case is the same, Gorgias, with all other arts besides: each of them deals with wordsthose, that is, that belong to the thing which is the object of each particular art.

Gor. So it appears.

Soc. Then why in the world don't you call all the rest of the arts rhetorical, when they are about words,' if you give the name of rhetoric to every one which deals with words?

Gor. Because, Socrates, in all the other arts the knowledge is, so to speak, entirely confined to manual operations

and such like actions, whereas in rhetoric there is no such manual process involved; but of all that it does and all that it effects words are the vehicle. That is why I claim on behalf of rhetoric that it is the art that deals with words; and I maintain that I am right.

Soc. I wonder whether I quite understand what sort c. 5. of art you mean to call it? (Never mind.) I shall know better by and by. Pray now answer me. We have such things as arts, haven't we?

Soc. But of all these arts, some I believe have production for their chief object, and require few words-some indeed none at all; in fact, the objects of the art might be carried out even in silence; such as painting and sculpture and many others. That is the kind which you seem to have in view, when you say that rhetoric has no connection with them. Isn't it?

Gor. You take my meaning perfectly, Socrates.

Soc. But other arts there are which perform all their operations by means of words, and as to acts, require either none at all, as one may say, in addition, or only in a very trifling degree; such as numeration for example, and reckoning, and land-measuring, and draughts, and a number of other arts, some of which have their 'words' pretty nearly equal in amount to their actions, most of them indeed more numerous; or even altogether their processes are carried on and their effects produced entirely by means of words. It is to this class, I believe, that you understand rhetoric to belong.

Gor. Quite true.

Soc. But I don't at all suppose that you mean to call any one of these rhetoric, although this was implied by the expression you used, in saying that the art whose effects are produced by words is rhetoric; and one might suppose if one chose to be captious in arguing, so then you mean arithmetic by rhetoric, do you, Gorgias? But I don't believe you

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do mean either arithmetic or geometry when you speak of rhetoric.

Gor. And quite right too, Socrates; your supposition is perfectly just.

Soc. Then let us begin at once, and do you do your part in dispatching the answer to my question. For as rhetoric is found to be one of those arts which chiefly employ words, and there are others also of the same kind, try to explain to me what it is in words upon which rhetoric operates in producing its effects; suppose, for instance, any one were to ask me about any one you please of the arts I just now mentioned what is the art of numeration, Socrates? I should tell him, as you said just now, that it is one of those that produce their effects by words. And if he were further to inquire, what are those about? I should say that it is one of those which are about (have for their object) the even and odd, the whole series of each of them, whatever the number may amount to. And if again he were to ask, And reckoning, what art do you call that? I should reply that this likewise is one of those that effects all its operations by words. And if he were to ask still further, what is its object? I should say, in the language of the framers of bills drawn for the assembly, 'in all else' the art of reckoning is 'like the foregoing';' for its object is the same, the even and the odd; but there is just this amount of difference between them, that the art of reckoning or arithmetic takes into consideration the relative as well as the absolute properties and relations of the even and the odd in point of number. And if the same question were repeated about

1 This refers to the formula employed when a πpoßoúλevμa of the Council was altered and modified in the general assembly. It was open to any citizen when a measure was sent down by the former body to the latter for its ratification, either to oppose it by a counter-proposition, or, accepting some of its provisions, to add others of his own, or to cancel or alter such as he disapproved. In the latter case, to avoid repetition, the proposed výpoμa usually commenced with the words τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῇ βουλῇ ἔδοξε.

astronomy, and upon my replying, that this again effects all its processes by words, the questioner were to say, And what are the words' (calculations, the science) of astronomy about, Socrates? I should tell him that they are about the motion of the stars and the sun and moon, that is to say, their relative velocities.

Gor. And you would be quite right, Socrates.

Soc. Come then, in your turn, Gorgias. It so happens, you see, that rhetoric is one of those arts that effect and give force to all their operations by words. Isn't it?

Gor. It is so.

Soc. Then tell me what they deal with. What of all things in the world is that which is the object of the words which rhetoric employs?

Gor. The most important of all human things, Socrates, and the best.

Soc. Nay, Gorgias, here again what you say is open to c. 7. question, and by no means clear as yet. For I think you must have heard at parties after dinner people singing this catch, in which in the words of the song the good things of this life are enumerated, how that health is best of all, the second best thing is to be born handsome, and the third, as the author of the catch says, to be rich without fraud.

Gor. To be sure I have; but what is your object in mentioning this?

Soc. Because those whose business lies in all those things 452 that the composer of the catch spoke so highly of would straightway present themselves, physician and training-master and tradesman; and first of all the physician would say, My dear Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you: for it is not his art that is employed upon mankind's greatest good, but mine. If then I were to ask him, And who are you that say this? he would reply probably, A physician. What say you then? Is it your art that has the greatest good for its object? How can health, Socrates, he would say very likely, be anything else? What greater blessing can men have than health?

And if again after him the trainer were to say, I should be surprised too myself, Socrates, if Gorgias can point out to you any greater good in his own art than I in mine; I should make answer to him again as to the other, And who may you be, my friend, I should like to know? and what's your business? A professor of gymnastics, he would say; and my say; and business is to make men strong and handsome in their persons. And next to the training-master the tradesman, I dare say, would tell us with a lofty scorn of them all, Do pray consider, Socrates, whether you think that there is any blessing superior to wealth, either in the eyes of Gorgias or of any one else whatsoever. We should say to him accordingly, What's that pray? are you the man that makes that? He would say yes. And what's your name? A man of business. How then? do you judge wealth to be the greatest blessing to mankind? we shall say. Of course I do, he will reply. Aye, but Gorgias here contends that his own art is the source of greater good than yours, we should say. Plainly then his next question would be, And what is this good? let Gorgias make answer. Come then, Gorgias, consider yourself to be questioned by them as well as me, and answer us what is that which you say is the greatest good to mankind, and that you can produce it.

Gor. That, Socrates, which really is the greatest good and the cause at once of freedom to men in general in their own persons, and no less to the individual man of acquiring power over others in his own city.

Soc. What name then pray do you give to this?

Gor. The power of persuading by words, I should call it, the judges in a court of law, or the councillors in a council-room, or the assembly men in an assembly, or any other kind of meeting which is convened for a public purpose. And yet (in spite of all you have said) by the aid of this talent you may make the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave: and for your famous man of business, it will turn out that he makes his money for somebody