is supposed to account in this particular case for the perfect sense of the aorist has really nothing whatever to do with it'. Where the Greeks said 'I once saw', we say 'I have seen'. Again; who would think of rendering the exulting song of the initiated, epuyov κακόν, εὗρον ἄμεινον, by anything but the English perfect? There is a similar difference between the French and German idioms and our own in the use of these tenses; that is, in sometimes expressing our aorist by a perfect and vice versâ, as waren sie? 'have you been?'; j'ai été... ‘I was.....'

Again a Greek not unfrequently writes yiyveola where an Englishman says simply 'to be'; and though I hold that the distinction between the two verbs is so philosophically important that it should always be maintained when it is possible so to do— and it will be seen that I have sometimes gone a little out of my way to maintain it—yet the neglect of it is sometimes (not often I believe) not only justifiable but absolutely required.

Of minor importance is the occasional omission of the article in rendering oi äλo, and perhaps other similar phrases; the non-observance of the position of the article with substantive and adjective, in which

1 I cannot agree with Mr Shilleto, crit. not. on Demosth. de F. L. § 228, in thinking that the addition of temporal particles such as ȧprí, TOλλáKIS, OỦ TÓTоte, can make any difference whatsoever in the "nature" or sense of the tense: the translation of the Greek aorist by our perfect in such cases is a mere matter of idiom. The text was written before I had seen Mr Shilleto's note, and without any reference to it.

the Greek form of expression likewise not unfrequently differs from familiar and idiomatic English ; the substitution of the indefinite for the Greek definite article when the latter denotes a class. On this subject see Buttmann's Greek Grammar, § 124. Obs. 2 (Engl. Transl.). It is explained quite unconsciously and accidentally by Aristotle, Rhet. II. 4. 31. τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ K. T.λ. See also Schneider's note on Plato de Rep. VIII. 564 A.

Passing over other idiomatic differences of a similar character, there remains one point which is important enough to be treated at greater length; more especially as the question is still unsettled, and a writer of high authority has pronounced a very uncompromising opinion upon it entirely opposed to what I believe to be the truth. I refer to the translation of où Távu, and I will take this opportunity to enter in detail upon the consideration of the whole question; but as the note promises to be a somewhat long one, it may perhaps find a fitter place in the Appendix'.

As to the aids of which I have availed myself in the translation, besides the notes of the Commentators, I have constantly had before me Schleiermacher's version and the Master of Trinity's Platonic Dialogues for English Readers; with the exception

1 See note C, in the Appendix.

h

of Cousin's translation, which I looked through many years ago, I have seen no other. Schleiermacher's version of this as of the other dialogues is so literal and so exact that it serves the purpose of a commentary of no mean order: as far as my observation extends, he very seldom misses the precise meaning of the original, and his extreme acuteness and thorough knowledge of his author render his assistance always valuable. Cousin's for any such purpose is absolutely worthless. The former however is, if I may venture to say so, too flat and lifeless at least to an English reader-to furnish much assistance in turning a phrase or suggesting an expression. Of Dr Whewell's work perhaps not much more than a third of this particular dialogue is a direct translation. To this I have to acknowledge a few obligations, for here and there a vigorous phrase or a happy turn of expression. But such direct obligations amount I believe scarcely to half a dozen; any other coincidences that may be found between our versions are accidental.

It only remains to say that the text I have followed is that of the Zurich Editors, except in a few rare instances which I have been careful to point out.

INTRODUCTION.

Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
These three alone lead life to sovereign power.
Yet not for power (power of herself
Would come uncalled for), but to live by law,
Acting the law we live by without fear;
And, because right is right, to follow right
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.

TENNYSON, none.

THE course of the argument of this dialogue is somewhat intricate and at first sight desultory, and the subjects treated in it are so multifarious, that the most various and diverse opinions have been entertained as to the leading purpose and intention of Plato in its composition. A good deal of the complexity and consequent difficulty vanishes upon closer inspection; but enough remains to render the main scope and design in some degree doubtful; and accordingly the most recent writers upon the subject are by no means in agreement with one another upon the point. A fair summary of their views is given by Stallbaum, Introduction, pp. 31—35, and I need not therefore repeat them here. Amongst these, a treatise by Bonitz, published in the transactions of the Viennese Academy of Sciences (to which my references are made) and also separately in Part I. of his Platonische Studien, deserves especial mention. It contains a careful analysis of the argument together with an inquiry into the leading idea of the dialogue, and a criticism of the views of two of his predecessors, Steinhart' and Susemihl, upon the same subject.

1. This name, that of the author of Introductions prefixed to Hieronymus Müller's translation of the Platonic dialogues, has been systematically converted

This essay is distinguished throughout by clearness moderation and good sense.

The Greek title of the dialogue is Γοργίας, ἢ περὶ ῥητοpikĥs, ȧvaτρETTIKÓS, Diog. Laert. Vit. Plat. § 59. These second titles, though it is generally agreed that they do not proceed from Plato himself, and have therefore no final and decisive authority in determining the true subject of his dialogues, yet as representing the earliest opinion as to the nature of their contents of native and probably well informed Platonists, should not I think be entirely set aside; and in this particular instance, as it seems to me, Rhetoric, the subject assigned by the title as the leading one, may when properly understood fairly put in its claim with the rest to be that which was uppermost in the author's mind in writing the Gorgias.

The term avαтрETTIKÓя, subversive, destructive, opposed to KaTaσKEVασTIKós, constructive, denotes that the Gorgias, like the Theatetus and Meno for example with which Schleiermacher places it in immediate connection, belongs to the class of polemical or dialectical dialogues; in which the object is not so much to establish a doctrine or build up a system, as to clear the ground for either of these by the removal of popular errors and fallacies and the refutation of antagonist speculations and theories. Of this class of the Platonic dialogues, to which Schleiermacher assigns the middle division in his arrangement, between the elementary and the constructive, placing the Gorgias at their head, he says, Introd. to Gorg. p. 4, that "they no longer treat as the first (the elementary) did of the Method of Philosophy, but of its object, with a view to attain a complete conception and a right distinction of it; nor yet at the same time do they seek

by Stallbaum into Reinhart, under which form it invariably appears in his Introduction, to the possible perplexity of many of his readers.

1 In citing Schleiermacher's Introductions I refer always to the original Introductions prefixed to his translation of the dialogues, not to Mr Dobson's English version.