time, the most perfect freedom. The Divinity, as the first and vital energy, has revealed himself from all eternity in an infinite variety of productions; yet continues always the same; Infinite, Immeasurable, Immoveable, and Unapproachable by any similitude. He is in all things, and all things in Him; because by Him and in Him all things live, act, and have their increase: He pervades the smallest portions of the Universe, as well as its infinite expanse: He influences every atom of it as well as the whole. It follows, that all things are animated; all things are good; because all things proceeded from good, and intended for good.

303. Bruno follows the same train of ideas in his reflections on the world (Universum, or Natura naturata), which he represents as One, Infinite, Eternal, and Imperishable. Nevertheless the world, in its external nature, and as containing the development of all things, is but the shadow of the Supreme Principle. Its element is Matter, as regards itself, formless; but identical with the primitive and eternal Form, it develops out of itself all accidental form. He maintained that none had better expressed than Pythagoras, in his theory of Numbers, the manner in which all things are derived from the Infinite Being as Unity: towards which the human understanding perpetually aspires. By the multiplication of its own Unity the First Principle causes the production of multifarious beings; but at the same time that It is the source of species and individuals beyond all calculation. It is Itself unlimited, and unconfined by Number, Measure, or Relation. It remains always One, and in every respect Indivisible; at once Infinitely Great and Infinitely Little. Inasmuch as by It all things are animated, the Universe may be represented as a Living Being an immense and infinite animal, in which all things live and act in a thousand and a thousand different ways.

:

Bruno endeavours to establish by a variety of proofs this eternity of the world; from the immortal destiny of Man; from the infinitude of the Creator's power, which must be productive of like infinite effects; from the goodness also of the Divine Being; as well as by metaphysical arguments drawn from our ideas of Infinite Space, and the impossibility of finding a Central Point; which last proof he ingeniously applies to the defence and confirmation of the

Copernican system: refuting the opposite theories, especially that of the Peripatetics. As the material world is but a shadow and reflection of the First Principle, so our knowledge altogether consists in the perception of Similitudes and Relations; and as the First Principle, descending from Its elevation, produced, by multiplication of Itself, the infinite diversity of natural objects, so do we gradually acquire the notion of Unity, by combining the Multifarious. The end of all philosophy is this recognition of the Unity of all in Contraries. In every individual the Soul assumes a particular form: inasmuch as its nature is simple and uncompounded it is immortal, without limits to its energies, and, by extension and contraction, it forms and fashions its own body.

To be born is the consequence of such expansion of the centre; Life consists in the maintenance of a spherical shape, and Death is the contraction into the same centre. The highest end of all free agents is the same with that of the Divine Intellect; namely, the perfection of the Whole.

Bruno's system is nothing more than that of the Eleatæ and Plotinus purified and extended: a sort of Pantheism, by many misunderstood as a system of Atheism; set forth with a persuasive eloquence springing from the author's own conviction, and with great richness of imagination; and engaging the attention by a multitude of striking and noble ideas. The system of Bruno continued long neglected or misunderstood, till the theories of Spinoza and Schelling directed towards it a degree of revived attention.* *

V. Sceptical writers.

304. Many combined views and ideas now gave birth to a new species of philosophical scepticism in certain calm and vigorous minds, which manifested itself according to the peculiar characters and habits of each. The causes of these new views were, the renewed study of the old

* Pantheism is of various kinds, two of which are the most obvious and prevalent, i. e. the Idealistic and the Realistic Pantheisms. In both cases the Absolute is unconscious, only becoming conscious in the Finite. (Hegel, Strauss, &c., are Idealistic Pantheists of this class). Bruno's Pantheism was of a neutral kind, as he admits a conscious Absolute.-ED.

philosophers; the awakened spirit of original investigation; the extended sphere of experimental observation; with the craving which began to be felt for more certain knowledge and better established principles; with all the discussions and theories which these causes set in motion, diversified according to the characters of their respective authors.

Montaigne.

Essais de Michel de Montaigne, Bordeaux, 1580; Lond. 1724; Paris, 1725, 3 vols. 4to.; Lond. 1739, 6 vols. 12mo. etc.

Eloge de Mich. de Montaigne, couronné à l'Acad. de Bordeaux en 1774 (par L'ABBE DE TALBERT), Par. 1775, 12mo. Eloge Analytique et Historique par DE LA DIXMERIE, Par. 1781, 8vo.

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305. Michel de Montaigne, or Montagne, was the first of his age who inclined to the philosophy of Doubt. With a mind highly cultivated by the study of the Ancients and of history; with great knowledge of the world and men; he embraced the image of human life as it is in itself and also in the phase of its multiplicity; without analysing these discrepancies so as to arrive at unity. His acute observation of the disagreement existing between all philosophical theories produced in him a way of thinking akin to positive Scepticism in matters of philosophy; and he pronounced the uncertainty of human knowledge and the feebleness of human reason to be the grand conclusions to which all his observations had led him; reposing with a sincere faith on the authority of Divine Revelation. The uncertainty which he ascribed to all human science he extended even to matters of practice, without however denying the truth of practical obligations. His opinions are expressed with admirable candour and modesty in his delightful Essays, the originality and graces of which have always made the book a favourite with men of taste, and have exerted a great influence; though his philosophy has been very differently estimated by different critics. Though his own character and conduct were free from the reproach of immorality and irreligion, his work has unquestionably the defect of easily leading to an opposite mode of thought, and of strengthening and forwarding it, as has actually taken place.

Born in a castle of the same name in Perigord 1533; died 1592.

Pierre Charron.

De la Sagesse: trois livres; par P. CHARRON, Bordeaux, 1601; edit. expurg. Par. 1604.

Eloge de P. Charron, par G. M. D. R. (GEORGE MICHEL DE ROCHEMAILLET), prefixed to the Works of Charron, Par. 1607. See BAYLE.

306. Montaigne had great influence over two distinguished authors of his own day: Etienne Boëtie (died 1563), counsellor of the parliament of Bordeaux; who in his Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, set forth with considerable talent his republican principles: and Pierre Charron (born at Paris 1541), an excellent spiritual orator, and a man of ability and spiritual character; but who, in consequence of his intimacy with Montaigne, having contracted a habit of Scepticism, expressed himself with greater freedom on religious points. According to him, Wisdom (la Sagesse), is the free investigation of what is common and habitual. The desire of knowledge is natural to man; but Truth resides with God alone, and a description of his Nature is undefinable by human reason. On this principle he grounds another, of distrust and indifference with regard to all science; a bold disbelief of Virtue (in its manfestation); and even of the great doctrines of Religion (particularly the immortality of the Soul), as well as of the foundations of all positive Religion, not excepting the Christian; alleging that its external history did not correspond with its divine original, and the ideal of God in the Reason, and the worship of God. On the other hand he insisted upon the obligations of a certain Internal Religion connected with Virtue, and founded in the knowledge of God and Self, and exhorted with power and dignity to the practice of moral duties derived from a certain everlasting and imperishable law of Nature, which has been implanted in the reason by God himself, and contains the highest good of Man. This crude theory he expressed with some eloquence, and died 1603, decried by many as an atheist; which he did not altogether deserve.

307. We perceive that the human mind had, in the period of which we are treating, attempted many paths, already opened, to the attainment of science, by the ways of Revelation, Reason, and Experience. None of them had

been pursued far enough, in order to lay a sure foundation; because, occupied with the pursuit of results and conclusions, men had omitted to begin by giving them a solid basis. They had not yet inquired in what respects Revelation may be justly expected to be a source of knowledge: nor had the pretensions of Experience and Reason to be severally the fountain-heads of knowledge, been balanced or adjusted. A sort of Scepticism, grounded on experience, discouraged the pride of philosophical speculation, without having the effect of silencing its inquiries; and rather busied itself with diving again into the exhausted mines of ancient doubts, than attempted any fresh proofs of the certainty of knowledge. A species of intellectual anarchy and chaos seemed for a time to prevail: the more exact knowledge derived from the writings of the ancients contributing rather to increase than to still the commotion; till it ended in something like an universal fermentation, which slowly defæcated. An immense mass of unorganized knowledge and manifold views contended together, till the necessity came to be gradually felt of more systematic and better-founded inquiries and knowledge; and to attain this end deeper and freer efforts were made, which became continually more effectual and more universal.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO OUR OWN

TIMES.

A free and progressive spirit of inquiry into the principles, the laws, and limits of human knowledge; with attempts to systematise and combine them.

308. It was time that the human mind should assume confidence in itself, and, relying on its own powers, force its way through the deep labyrinth of knowledge. Many causes which we have already enumerated combined to stimulate its exertions; and among the most powerful were the desire of elucidating the grounds of Religious and Moral knowledge; and the wish to reconcile and associate the